In 1944, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern studied the distribution of power in voting systems in their book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior [19] . They dealt with a \simple game" in which the only goal is \winning". This is an abstraction of the constitutional political machinery for voting. This paper deals with the weighted majority game, which is a familiar example of voting systems.
In 1960s, U.S. Supreme Court handed down a series of \one person one vote" decisions. After that, calculations of power indices using real data were carried out and presented as evidence in the courtroom. For example, the courts in New York State have accepted the Banzhaf index (also called the Coleman value or Chow parameters) as an appropriate measure for weighted voting systems. The calculation normally requires the aid of a computer and so many counties in U.S. hire specialized consultants, mathematicians or computer scientists (see [13] ). 1
In this paper, we discuss some algorithms for calculating power indices. In Section 2, we dene weighted majority games and related concepts. Section 3 denes three power indices, the Shapley-Shubik power index, the Banzhaf index and the Deegan-Packel index. Section 4 shows complexity classes of the problems for calculating power indices. In Sections 5,6 and 7, we discuss dynamic programming techniques, enumeration methods and Monte Carlo methods.
In papers [21, 22] , Owen proposed approximation algorithms for calculating the ShapleyShubik indices and the Banzhaf indices based on multilinear extensions. The methods are written in Owen's book [23] (Chapter XII) in detail with a numerical example of the Presidential Election Game in United States. So, we omit Owen's approximation algorithms.
Weighted Majority Games
In this paper, we consider a special class of cooperative games called weighted majority games. Let N = f1; 2; . . . ; ng be a set of players. A subset of players is called a coalition.
A weighted majority game G is dened by a sequence of nonnegative numbers G = [q; w 1 ; w 2 ; . . . ; w n ];
where we may think of w i as the number of votes, or weight of player i and q as the threshold or quota needed for a coalition to win. In this paper, we assume that q; w 1 ; w 2 ; . . . ; w n are nonnegative integers and (1=2) P n i=1 w i < q P n i=1 w i . We also assume the following property. Assumption For further discussions of (general) voting games, see books [23] , [18] and [27] for example.
The Power Indices
Sometimes, similar weighted majority games have very dierent structures of winning coalitions. For example, let us consider games G n = [5n 0 4; 10; 10; . . . ; 10; 1] with n 2 players. If n is an even number, v(S + n) = v(S 0 n) for all S N and so player n can contribute nothing to any coalition. If n is an odd number, a coalition is winning if and only if the size is greater than n=2 and so each player seems to have the same power.
Measure of power plays a useful role in assessing the character of players in the weighted majority games. In this paper, we deal with three measures of power or power indices; (1) the Shapley-Shubik index [25, 26] , (2) the Banzhaf index [1, 8] , and (3) the Deegan-Packel index [5] .
The Shapley-Shubik index
The Shapley value is a solution concept of n-person cooperative games derived from a set of axioms [25, 7] . In 1954, Shapley and Shubik discussed the Shapley value of voting games, and so the Shapley value of voting games is called the Shapley-Shubik index (S-S index) [26] . Let = ( 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; n ) be a permutation dened on the set of players N. We say that player i is the pivot of the permutation , if f 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; i01 g is a losing coalition and f 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; i01 ; i g is a winning coalition. When we assume that all the permutations have the same probability 1=n!, the pivot probability
X f(jSj 0 1)!(n 0 jSj)! : S 2 W; S 0 i 6 2 Wg is the Shapley-Shubik index (S-S index) of player i. We denote the S-S index of player i by ' i . It is easy to show that the inequalities w 1 w 2 1 1 1 w n imply that the S-S indices satisfy the inequalities ' 1 ' 2 1 1 1 ' n .
The Banzhaf index
The Banzhaf index (Bz index) is proposed by Banzhaf in 1965 [1] . The index is also called the Coleman value or Chow parameters. Dubey and Shapley discussed axioms to derive the Bz index [8] . (for complete description, see Table 1 ) where the weights (the numbers of electoral votes) are obtained from 1996 census data on the following internet home page. http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/map1.htm Table 1 shows the power indices of this game. The number of minimal winning coalitions of this game is 51,476,401,254,318. When player i satises that 8S N 0 i; v(S) = v(S + i), player i is called a dummy player. When a pair of players i; j satises 8S N n fi; jg, v(S + i) = v(S + j), we say that the pair is symmetric. The following theorem shows the hardness for checking these characters of players.
Theorem 2 Under Assumption 1, both of the following two problems are NP-complete.
(1) Is player n not a dummy player?
(2) Is the pair of players 1 and 2 not symmetric? We show a polynomial time reduction of the partition problem [9, 11] dened below to problems (1) and (2). Given a set of positive integers fa 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a k g, the partition problem checks the existence of an index subset T f1; 2; . . . ; kg satisfying the condition that P i2T a i = (1=2)M where M = P k i=1 a i . To prove NP-completeness of (1) and (2) where q 1 and q 2 are the minimum integers which is greater than the half of the sum of all the voting weights, respectively. Then it is easy to show that the following three statements are equivalent; (a) the given partition problem has YES answer, (b) player n of game G 1 is not a dummy player, and (c) the pair of players 1 and 2 of G 2 is not symmetric.
The NP-completeness of problem (1) is described in the book [9] by Garey and Johnson without proof (see p.280, problem [MS8]). Problem (2) is discussed in [16] .
For the S-S index, the Bz index, and the D-P index, player i is dummy if and only if the corresponding index of player i is equal to 0. It implies the following. Corollary 3 Under Assumption 1, all the problems for calculating player n's indices ' n (the S-S index), n (the Bz index), and n (the D-P index) are NP-hard.
The above corollary says that it is hard to calculate power indices of a weighted majority game when the input size is large.
For the S-S index and the Bz index, a pair of players is symmetric if and only if the corresponding pairs of indices are equivalent. So, we have the following. Corollary 4 Under Assumption 1, both of the problems for calculating the pair of S-S indices (' 1 ; ' 2 ) and the pair of Bz indices ( 1 ; 2 ) are N P-hard.
The above result implies that even if we need to calculate indices of biggest and second biggest players, it is still hard. For the D-P indices, the situation is complicated. Even if the D-P indices of a pair of players are equivalent, the pair is not always symmetric (see the numerical example in the subsection of the denition of the D-P index).
In [6] , Deng and Papadimitriou proved the following result.
Theorem 5 Under Assumption 1, both of the problems to calculate power indices ' n and n are #P-complete.
The paper [6] proved the above theorem in the case of the S-S index. However, we can show the case of the Bz index in a similar way. Lastly, we consider a well-solvable special case. Theorem 6 Under Assumption 1, the following statements are equivalent.
(1) The pair of players 1 and n is symmetric.
(2) Each pair of players is symmetric. Proof!' Obviously, (1) and (2) It is easy to show that (3) implies (4) . Lastly, we show that (4) implies (3). For any coalition S satisfying jSj k, the inequality P i2S w i w n0(k01) + 1 1 1 + w n q holds and so S 2 W. If a coalition S 0 satises jS 0 j < k, then P i2S 0 w i w 1 + 1 1 1 + w k01 < q and so S 0 is losing. The above theorem shows that we can check the symmetricity of player 1 and player n in O(n) time.
Dynamic Programming
In this section, we assume that w i < q for each player i. We partition the set of players N into coalitions N 1 ; N 2 ; . . . ; N z satisfying that: In addition, we denote the cardinality jN x j by n x and the weight of a player in N x by w x .
Preprocedure
Here we describe the preprocedure. The preprocedure solves the following two problems; (1) problem for constructing the set of all dummy players, and (2) problem for counting the number of all the minimal winning coalitions. If there exist dummy players, we can delete the players without changing power indices (the S-S index, the Bz index and the D-P index). Thus, by removing all the dummy players, we may reduce the computational eorts required at the main procedure described in the next subsection. We use the result of the problem (2) when we calculate the D-P index in the main procedure.
The following property plays an important role to construct the set of all the dummy players. The denition of j implies that P 
Dynamic programming for calculating power indices
There exist dynamic programming algorithms for calculating the S-S index and the Bz index [4, 15, 12] .
In the following, we modify the algorithms in [4, 15, 12] and construct a dynamic programming algorithm for calculating the S-S index, the Bz index and the D-P index simultaneously in pseudo polynomial time. In the above equalities, we used the property i 2 N y in the description of i .
Now we describe our algorithm. Clearly from the denition, we can calculate the D-P indices by generating all the minimal winning coalitions. In this subsection, we consider an ecient algorithm for generating all the minimal winning coalitions.
We consider the problem for generating all the minimal sets in F(a; b) where a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n ) > is a positive integer vector and b is an integer. The algorithm uses the divide and conquer technique based on the following theorem.
Theorem 8 Let a = (a 1 ; a 2 ; . . . ; a n ) > be a positive real vector and b be a real number satisfying the conditions that a 1 a 2 1 1 1 a n > 0 and a 1 + a 2 + 1 1 1 + a n b. Then the pair of families From the above S = f1g and so S 0 1 = ; 2 F(a; b). Contradiction. By using the (n 0 1)-vector a 0 = (a 2 ; a 3 ; . . . ; a n ) > , we can describe the pair of families The above recursive algorithm either outputs a minimal set or calls procedure ENU-MERATE at least once. The height of the recursive tree of the algorithm is less than n and so the number of calls of procedure ENUMERATE is less than or equal to n times the number of minimal sets. The time complexity of each line in procedure ENUMERATE is bounded by O(1) when we update the value (a n 0 +1 + 1 1 1 + a n ) at each iteration. Thus, the time complexity of the above algorithm is O(nj min F(a; b)j) and memory complexity is O(n). Now we construct our algorithm for calculating the D-P indices as follows. When the above algorithm generates an additional minimal winning coalition, we update the (current) D-P indices. The algorithm updates the current D-P indices of all the players and so we can obtain the D-P indices of all the players in O(nj min Wj) time and O(n) space.
Enumeration algorithm for calculating S-S indices and Bz indices
In this subsection, we describe algorithms for calculating the S-S index and the Bz index of player i. We denote the (n 0 1)-vector (w 1 ; w 2 ; . . . ; w i01 ; w i+1 ; . . . ; w n ) > by w 0 = In the above recursive algorithm, the number of calls of procedure SHELLING is bounded by n times the number of minimal sets, i.e., the number of outputs. When we construct binomial sequences 1 ; 2 ; . . . ; n in a preprocedure, each line in function is bounded by O(n). Thus the total time complexity is O(n 2 j min F(a; b)j). Since the height of the recursive call tree is less than n, we only need to maintain at most n vectors whose dimension is less than or equal to n. Each element in the vector is an integer less than or equal to n! and so the space complexity is also bounded by a polynomial of n. In this section, we consider the most likelihood method based on Monte Carlo sampling for calculating the S-S indices and the Bz indices.
Monte Carlo method for calculating S-S indices
The denition of the S-S index says that the S-S index of player i is equal to the probability that the player i becomes the pivot player under the assumption that all the permutations have the same probability 1=n!.
Choose p 3 permutations of players at random. Let P i be the number of permutations such that the player i is the pivot player. Then the random variables P 1 ; . . . ; P n have a multinomial distribution: [14] . They applied their Monte Carlo methods for obtaining the S-S indices of the Electoral College game(see Section 3.4) . By calculating a gain of each method, they showed that a \cycling scheme" described below was eectual. A target player i is singled out, and the remaining players are placed in a random order. However, this order is then put through all of its cyclic permutations, and the player i is inserted in each position in each permutation. Thus (N 0 1)N permutations are generated. We illustrate below the cycling sampling scheme for ve players a; b; c; d and i. where the objective is the maximization of log-likelihood. In the following, we describe the solution method of this problem.
For any non-negative vector p = (p 1 ; . . . ; p n ) > , the vector p c = (p c 0 ; p c 1 ; . . . ; p c n ) > satisfying p c
